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INDEMNIFICATION CONTRACTS-
SOME SUGGESTED PROBLEMS
AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
JOHN R. COLLINS* AND DENIS DUGAN**
Indemnification agreements in construction or remodeling contracts,
leases and the like, take various forms. All are generally directed toward
securing indemnification from a contractor or lessee against liability to
the property owner for damage to property or injuries arising out of
the contractor's repairs or construction on or about the owner's prem-
ises, or arising out of the lessee's operations.
The question arises whether the indemnification agreements protect
the owner in cases where negligence of its own employees may have
caused or contributed to the accident and the resulting damages. An
indemnification agreement is to be distinguished from an exculpatory
clause. "An exculpatory clause is one which excuses one party from
liability for otherwise valid claims which may be made against him
by another. Third parties are not involved."1 "An Indemnification or
Hold Harmless Agreement . . . is an agreement whereby one party
to a lease or other contract agrees to protect the other from claims for
loss or damage made against the indemnitee by a third party."2
The law varies from state to state with regard to the enforceability
of indemnification contracts. Generally they are enforceable even where
the negligence of the party securing the indemnification (the indemnitee)
causes or contributes to causing the damages. However, indemnifica-
tion agreements are interpreted to extend to such cases only if the
contract expressly states that it applies where the indemnitee is neg-
ligent.3 The courts generally have been very hesitant to interpret in-
*LL.B. University of Wisconsin Law School, 1954; Member of firm, Foley,
Sammond & Lardner, Milwaukee.
**B.A., Marquette University (1965); candidate for J.D. degree, Marquette
University (1967).
'Lewy, The Use of Exculpatory Clauses Affecting Real Property, Leases, and
Hold Harmless Agreements and the Insurance Implications Involved, 46 Chi.
B. Record 131 (Dec. 1964).
2 Ibid.
3 See Annot., 143 A.L.R. 312, 316 (1943) and Annot, 175 A.L.R. 8, 30 (1948);
27 AM. JUjR. Indemnity §15 (1940. It is noted that 27 Am. JuR. Indemnity,
§9 (1940) stated the majority of courts held such indemnification agreements
void ,but in the 1965 Pocket Part Supplement to the section, the opposite rule
is stated as follows: "A contrary view is taken by the great majority of modem
cases." See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §572 (1932), and Thompson-Starrett Co.,
Inc. v. Otis Elevator Co., 271 N.Y. 36, 2 N.E. 2d 35 (1936). In Hollingsworth
v. Chrysler Corp., 208 A. 2d 61, 62 (Del. 1965) the court stated:
"Courts in nearly all jurisdictions which have faced this problem have
applied the general rule that the indemnitor is not to be viewed as an
insurer and have indicated that the indemnitee will not be protected
against the consequences of his own negligence unless the agreement
clearly and unequivocally requires it."
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demnification contracts to provide indemnification against damages
resulting from the negligence or other fault of the indemnitee, and have
construed indemnification agreements which appear to be very broad
and all-inclusive in their language, as not including indemnification for
damages arising from the negligence of the employees of the indemnitee.4
See McKenna and Bartler, Developments in the Law of Indemnity, THE FORUM
Vol. 1 No. 1, p.7 (1965). Agreements to indemnify are to be strictly con-
strued. Id. at p.8. But for a modern, though still minority view, see Jackson-
ville Terminal Co. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 296 F. 2d 256, 261-62 (5th
Cir. 1961).
4 See Curtis, Third-Party Indemnity ond Coverage, 1965 INs. L.J. 594. The
author states at p.594:
"No one should be permitted to benefit unjustly from his own wrong-
doing. The active primary wrongdoer should ultimately bear the burden
of damages and hold harmless the party who is a passive or technical
tort feasor."
Also at p. 595:
"The decisional difficulty, however, is experienced in the constant battle
as to who is to be considered passively negligent, and who, as a matter
of law, is actively negligent. For this reason, if for no other, when the
contract does not provide for absolute indemnity many opinions of
divergent conclusions have been written."
See George Sollitt Constr. Co. v. Gateway Erectors, Inc., 260 F. 2d 165 (7th
Cir. 1958) (negligence of the general contractor not expressly covered in con-
tract of indemnity; courts require the language to be in explicit terms before
enforcing indemnity); Whirlpool Corp. v. Morse, 222 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn.
1963) (contract to hold party harmless even in event of its own negligence
does not contravene public policy; case also describes the situations in which
recovery may be had) ; Hollingsworth v. Chrysler Corp., 208 A. 2d 61 (Del.
1965).
See Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124
(1956) in which there was no express agreement of indemnity, but there was
an informal agreement between shipowner and stevedore-contractor (Ryan)
whereby the latter agreed to perform all owner's stevedoring operations. The
owner of the ship was held liable for the injuries suffered by a longshoreman.
Owner sued contractor, who had undertaken to do the owner's loading of the
ship. The injuries were due to insufficiently secured rolls loaded by an em-
ployee of the contractor. The Court held that the shipowner had a right to
indemnity from the contractor. The obligation is based upon what the Court
termed the implied obligation of stevedore not only to stow the paper rolls,
but to stow them properly and safely; the obligation is not "quasi-contractual"
or "implied in law" or "arising out of a non-contractual relationship"; rather,
the Supreme Court says, the obligation is "the essence of petitioner's steve-
doring contract" and based upon a "warranty of workmanlike service that is
comparable to a manufacturer's warranty of the soundness of its manufac-
tured product." The Court stated (at p. 132) that "if the shipowner did hold
such an express agreement of indemnity here, it is not disputed that it would
be enforceable against the indemnitor." The contractor argued that the ship-
owner bad an obligation to supervise and since he failed to do so, he should be
barred from indemnity. But the Court said (at pp. 134-35) :
"Whatever may have been the respective obligations of the stevedoring
contractor and of the shipowner to the injured longshoreman for proper
stowage of the cargo, it is clear that, as between themselves, the con-
tractor, as the warrantor of its own services cannot use the shipowner's
failure to discover and correct the contractor's own breach of warranty
as a defense. Respondent's failue to discover and correct petitioner's own
breach of contract cannot here excuse that breach." (Emphasis added).
See also Mayer v. Fairlawn Jewish Center, 38 N.J. 549, 186 A. 2d 274 (1962)
where the court cited the Ryan doctrine of implied contractual indemnity in a
construction contract case. See also McKenna and Bartler, supra note 3, at pp.
11 et seq., especially at pp. 15-18 for cases citing the Ryan rule. These cases of
implied contractual indemnity (i.e., related to a contractual relationship but
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently held that the indemnity
clause there involved was not applicable, because it did not expressly
provide for indemnification for negligence solely caused by the alleged
indemnitee. 5 The Court stated it favored "strict construction of indem-
nity contracts" in line with "the overwhelming majority of the other
states."' , The language of the indemnification contract in that case was
broad, providing that the indemnitor (a subcontractor) would assume
full responsibility for any damages to personal property "in the per-
formance of the contract arising out of the assumed work, whether di-
rectly or indirectly, to be performed"7 by the indemnitor. The agree-
ment also provided that the indemnitor would hold the owner and
contractor harmless from any claims for injury "resulting from, or
arising out of, and in connection with, any of the subcontractor's
operations."8 In the light of this case, what are the drafting problems
confronting the Wisconsin attorney preparing an indemnity clause to
protect his owner-client? Similarly, what are the exposures undertaken
by the contractor or lessee which its attorney should recognize and sug-
gest insuring against?
SEVEN POSSIBLE SITUATIONS TO BE CONSIDERE
There are seven possible situations to be considered in connection
with arriving at an indemnification agreement that will offer maximum
protection to an owner seeking indemnification for any costs, expenses,
damages, or the like, incurred as a result of operations by third parties
(contractors, subcontractors, lessees, etc.) on its premises. These situa-
tions are:
1. The contractor or lessee is negligent and their negligence or other
fault is the sole cause of the damages to person or property;9
2. The contractor or lessee is negligent and the owner is also negligent,
so that their combined fault is the sole cause of the damages;
3. Owner's negligence is the sole cause of damages.
4. The damages are caused by the negligence or other fault of some
third party (i.e., a person who is not an employee, agent, or other
legal representative of either the owner or the contractor or lessee) ;
5. The damages are caused by the fault of the owner and the fault of
some third party;
without reference to an express indemnity provision) are beyond the scope of
this article. Similarly, "common law indemnity" (i.e., without reference to a
contractual relationship at all; see McKenna and Bartler, mepra at pp. 20 et
seq.) is also outside the scope of this article.
5 Mustas v. Inland Constr., Inc., 19 Wis. 2d 194, 120 N.W. 2d 95, 121 N.W. 2d
274 (1963).
Id. at 206.
7Id. at 205.
8 Id. at 206.
9 Throughout this article, reference to fault of a contractor, lessee or owner
should be read to include fault of any employee or other person for whose
acts the contractor, lessee or owner is held legally responsible.
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6. The damages are caused by the fault of the contractor or lessee
and the fault of a third party;
7. The "accident" is a pure accident in that no one is at fault, but
damages occur and the question of allocating the cost of these
damages arises.
These various possible situations are discussed in the above order,
in the following paragraphs:
(1) The law is well settled that any indemnification agreement will
provide indemnification in cases where the damages arise solely from
the fault or negligence of the contractor. If the owner incurs liability
as a result of an accident so caused, there is, under the law of most
jurisdictions, a common law right to indemnification which would be
applicable even if no written indemnifcation agreement were present.
"It is clear, from the foregoing common law rules that one who is him-
self without fault and is forced by operation of law to defend himself
against the act of another, can recover over against that other the entire
amount of the loss, including reasonable attorney's fees encountered." 10
[Emphasis supplied.] Accordingly, virtually any indemnification agree-
ment worthy of its name will insure protection against expenses arising
out of such an accident.
(2) In cases falling in the second category, the courts are reluctant
to impose an obligation of indemnification upon a contractor in cases
where the owner of the building, through negligence or other fault of
its employees, contributed to the damages arising. Most courts have
held that in such a situation the indemnification contract does not apply,
unless there is an express statement that it is to be applicable to such
a case or unless the court considers the language so clear that it admits
of no other interpretation.
A number of factors have been considered by the courts in deter-
mining whether or not to enforce an indemnification agreement in such
a situation. For example, in a Wisconsin case, Criswell v. Seaman Body
Corp.," the owner of a building was held liable to an employee of a
subcontractor for failure to comply with the Wisconsin Safe-Place
Statute requirement to provide a "safe place" of employment, even
though there was no active negligence or fault on the part of the owner.
In a subsequent case involving the same accident, Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co. v. Worden-Allen Co.,1 2 in which the owner's insurer
sued for indemnification for the amounts it had paid to the subcon-
tractor's employee, the Wisconsin Supreme Court enforced indemnifi-
cation against .the subcontractor whose active negligence caused the
10 Hennessey, The New Construction Statute, 47 MASS. L. Q. 421, 422 (1962-);
Zulkee v. Wing, 20 Wis. 408 (1866). See also Hartford Accident and Indem-
nity Co. v. Worden-Allen Co., 238 Wis. 124, 130, 297 N.W. 436, 439 (1941).
11 233 Wis. 606, 290 N.W. 177 (1940).12 238 Wis. 124, 297 N.W. 436 (1941).
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accident, although the contract did not state it applied where owner's
fault contributed to the damages.13 The court expressed reservations
as to whether the agreement would have applied had the accident been
caused solely by the active negligence of the owner.14 This distinction
between active and passive negligence is commented on in Mustas v.
Inland Const., Inc."
(3) In situations where the fault of the owner is the sole cause of
the injuries, the courts are even more reluctant to impose liability upon
the indemnitor. Typical of this attitude is the language of a federal
court of appeals in Batson-Cook Co. v. Industrial Steel Erectors.6
There the court stated that the imposition of such liability upon 'an
indemnitor "must be spelled out in unmistakable terms. It cannot come
from reading into the general words used the fullest meaning which
lexicography would permit."'1 7 The language of the indemnification
agreement was very broad, stating that the building subcontractor would
indemnify the general contractor for "any and all losses 'sustained in
connection with or [alleged] to have arisen out of or resulting from the
performance of the work by subcontractor. . . .' "18 A few courts have
construed indemnification agreements to cover such a situation even
though the language did not expressly cover a case where the owner-
indemnitee was, or was claimed to be, negligent. 9
13Accord, Williams v. Midland Constructors, 221 F. Supp. 400, 403 (E.D. Ark.
1963).
"[U]nder Arkansas law an indemnitee under an express contract of in-
demnity does not lose all of his right to indemnity with respect to liability
imposed by reason of the negligence of the indemnitor merely because the
indemnitee's own negligence contributed to the injury."
14 Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Worden-Allen Co., 238 Wis. 124, 129, 297 N.W.
436, 439 (1941) :
"It may very well be that if the injuries had arisen solely out of Seaman's
default in some respect, and were not in any way attributable to Worden
there would be no liability under the indemnity agreement."
'5 19 Wis. 2d 194, 207, 120 N.W. 2d 95, 102 (1963). See also discussion in Mc-
Kenna and Bartler, supra note 4, at pp. 22 et seq.
16 257 F. 2d 410 (5th Cir. 1958) ; see cases in accord cited in Mustas v. Inland
Constr. Co., at 207-08, 120 N.W. 2d at 102.
'- Batsom-Cook Co. v. Industrial Steel Erectors, 257 F. 2d 410,413 (5th Cir. 1958).
18 Id. at 412-13.
19 Russell v. Shell Oil Co., Inc., 339 Ill. App. 168, 89 N.E. 2d 415 (1949) ; United
States Steel Corp. v. Emerson-Constock Co., 141 F. Supp. 143, 146 (N.D. Ill.
1956), stating businessmen do not enter into contracts using broad, inclusive
language, if they have in mind unexpressed reservations as to indemnification
against fault of the indemnitee (this statement is contrary to the general rule) ;
National Transit Co. v. Davis, 6 F. 2d 729, 731-32 (3d Cir. 1925), stating if the
indemnity contract applied only where the indemnitee were blameless, it would
apply to nothing; Insurance Co. v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry., 229 F. 2d 705(7th Cir. 1956) ; Northern Pac. Ry. v. Thornton Bros. Co., 206 Minn. 193, 288
N.W. 226-28 (1939), contending for a "fair construction" of the language used
and stating that unless it applied to cases of indemnitee's fault it would have
little purpose. Union Pac. R.R. v. Ross Transfer Co., 64 Wash. 2d 486, 488,
392 P. 2d 450, 451 (1964) :
"The sole issue presented on this appeal is whether the phrase in the
indemnity agreement'... acts or omissions ... of the contractor (Ross)
..' limits the liability of the indemnitor Ross to exclude liability when
1966]
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While there was much doubt in the early decisions, the modern
cases are almost unanimous in holding that a contract which does ex-
pressly cover negligence of the indemnitee, is valid and will be en-
forced.20 Automobile and other liability insurance policies are examples
of the same kind of contract. 21 An obvious distinction exists between
such indemnification contracts, and so-called exculpatory contracts
whereby a contracting party signs away in advance any right to recover
for damages incurred through the negligence or other fault of the other
party to the contract. The latter contracts are still void in many states,
and apparently in Wisconsin.2 2 An indemnity contract, on the other
hand, does not prevent recovery for the damages; it merely shifts the
burden of paying the damage to the indemnitor.
There are obvious problems in securing agreement to an indemnifi-
cation contract that provides the contractor or lessee will have to pay
for damages incurred even as a result of negligence of the owner. The
dilemma is that unless the contract is drawn expressly so to provide, it
probably will'not be construed by a court to provide the desired indem-
nity in this situation.
(4) If the expenses and damages are incurred solely as a result of
both the indemnitor Ross and indemnitee Railroad are concurrently
negligent. We hold that it does not."
The Court indicates the only situation where indemnity to the railroad would
serve any purpose is in a case founded in whole or in part upon the railroad's
own negligence.
One author has expressed the view that the general rule today no longer
requires express mention of negligence of the indemnitee in order for the
indemnity to apply.
"However, as time passed the courts have gradually realized (sic.
relaxed) this rule so that no longer need the indemnification for one's
own negligence be express or explicit as long as the intent is clear and
unambiguous."
Curtis, Some Thoughts on Third Party Indemnity and Coverage, in A.B.A.
Section of Insurance, Negligence and Compensation Law. 1964-65 Proceed-
ings 266, 269.20 Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Worden-Allen Co., 238 Wis. 124, 129, 297 N.W.
436, 438 (1941); Johnson v. Prange-Guessenhainer Co., 240 Wis. 363, 374, 2
N.W. 2d 723, 728 (1942) ; Cernohorsky v. Northern Liquid Gas Co., 268 Wis.
586, 592, 68 N.W. 2d 429, 433 (1955); Umnus v. Wisconsin Public Service
Corp., 260 Wis. 433, 441-42, 51 N.W. 2d 42, 47 (1952) ; Baltimore & 0. R.R. v.
Youngstown Boiler & Tank Co., 64 F. 2d 638 (6th Cir. 1933) ; Southern Pac.
Co. v. Fellows, 22 Cal. App. 2d 87, 71 P. 2d 75 (1937); St. Louis & S. Ry. v.
Stewart, 187 S.W. 836 (1916).
21Jacksonville Terminal Co. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 296 F. 2d 256
(5th Cir. 1961). In Jacksonville, the court stated at p. 262:
"It presumes, first of all, that one party's assumption of liability
for losses due to another's negligence is an 'unusual' and 'hazardous'
undertaking. We cannot agree. In the light of modern conditions, we
perceive little justification for so characterizing the indemnitor's obliga-
tion. Insurance companies assume this obligation every day . .. ."
'2 See dicta in Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Worden-Allen Co., 238 Wis. 124,
131, 297 N.W. 436, 440 (1941); Mayers v. Cities Service Oil Co., 148 F. Supp.
199 (E.D. Wis. 1957), and the early Wisconsin case therein cited, Fox v.
Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 138 Wis. 648, 653, 120 N.W. 399, 401 (1909).
See Annot. 175 A.L.R. 8, 20 (1948) for discussion of further differences
between exculpatory and indemnification agreements.
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the negligence or other fault of a third party (neither the contractor
nor the owner) and if the incident meets the other tests of the indemni-
fication language as to time (e.g., "during the time the contractor is
performing work or is maintaining equipment on the premises"), place
(e.g., "in or about the premises which are the subject of the contract"),
and cause of occurrence (e.g., "arising out of or related to the con-
tractor's operations"), the situation should be covered by the indemnifi-
cation agreement. For example, the owner of a building might well in-
cur liability under a workmen's compensation statute which would
make the owner responsible for injuries incurred by one of his work-
men on the premises, even though neither the owner nor the contractor
were in any way at fault and the accident was caused solely by the
fault of some third party or by the fault of the injured party himself.
An indemnification agreement in the form commonly used should pro-
vide indemnification against such expenses.
(5) Where the owner's employees' negligence, together with negli-
gence of a third party, contributes to causing the damages, the reluc-
tance of the courts to broadly interpret an indemnification agreement
comes into play again. Unless the agreement expressly says it is to apply
even where the owner's fault causes or contributes to the damages, it
will probably not provide indemnification. The cases do not generally
distinguish these various situations, but merely express the rule that
where the indemnitee's employees' fault contributes to the damages,
express language is necessary for the agreement to apply.2 3 However,
the courts probably would be most reluctant to apply an indemnification
agreement where the sole fault is that of the owner's employees (situa-
tion 3), somewhat less reluctant where fault of some third party com-
bines with owner's negligence (situation 5), and even less reluctant
where owner's fault and the contractor-indemnitor's fault combine to
cause the loss (situation 2). But in any of these situations the risk is
substantial that no indemnification will apply unless the clause, in ex-
press and unambiguous terms, states it applies whether the owner is
negligent or not.
(6) Where negligence of the contractor's employees combines with
fault of a third party, indemnification would probably be applied under
most indemnity clauses. Since no fault exists on the owner's part, the
indemnity would probably be enforced even under the usual policy of
strict interpretation.
(7) If the damages and costs incurred are a result of a pure acci-
dent which occurs during the time the contractor-indemnitor is on the
premises and has some connection with the work of the contractor-in-
demnitor, most indemnification agreements would provide protection to
23 U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Mason and Dulion Co., Inc., 274 Ala. 202,
145 So. 2d 711 (1962); Miller & Co. v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 328 F. 2d 73(Sth Cir. 1964).
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the owner. An example of an instance where the owner of the building
might incur expense in such a situation is under a workmen's compen-
sation statute where liability could be incurred regardless of whether
anyone was at fault.
DRAFTING PROBLEMS
A complicating factor in drafting indemnification contracts is that
ultimate determination of fault is seldom made. That is to say, most
claims are disposed of by settlement based on compromise and a weigh-
ing of the chances of liability being assessed against one or more alleged
tortfeasors. The claimant may claim owner was at fault, but owner
disagrees and contends the contractor's employee was negligent; the
contractor may disagree with both and claim no one was at fault, or
point to a third person or claimant himself as having caused the acci-
dent. Often there is also dispute whether the claim, in fact, "arose out
of" or was "related to" the performance of the contract. To obviate this
problem, indemnification clauses should contain language referring both
to ultimate facts (e.g., "claims arising out of the contract") and to the
"facts" as alleged by a claimant (e.g., or "claims alleged to arise out
of the contract"). Similar references can be made regarding the fault
question (e.g., "whether or not caused, or claimed to be caused, in whole
or in part, by negligence or other fault of the owner.")
Two alternative forms of broad indemnification agreements are
presented in Exhibits A and B. They are designed for a construction
contract situation, but could be modified for use in lessor-lessee agree-
ments. Exhibit A is a broad form of indemnification which would
probably be construed by a court to provide indemnification protection
to the "owner" in all of the seven situations discussed above. In order
to provide this protection it is necessary that the language of the agree-
ment be extremely explicit and detailed. This obviously may raise prob-
lems of the acceptability of such an agreement to contractors. Exhibit
A is proffered, not as an example of a practical solution to the dilemma,
but as an example of (1) the extreme to which it appears necessary
to go to obviate most questions of interpretation and (2) the conse-
quent problems of acceptability. Exhibit B is a modified form of in-
demnification agreement which is shorter and perhaps more readily
acceptable to a contractor. It is believed that either indemnification
is broad enough to provide indemnification in any of the seven
situations; but the less detailed and explicit Exhibit B could give rise
to problems, such as questions as to place and time of occurrence.
CONCLUSION
The problem of allocating the cost of injuries and property damage
incurred on premises during the time work is being performed by con-
tractors and subcontractors, or during lessee operations, presents, at
base, a question of insuring against the risks and of who buys the in-
[Vol. 50
INDEMNIFICATION CONTRACTS
surance. 24 The indemnification agreements in Exhibits A and B are
submitted with the idea that they may have the advantage of being
clear in their intention to provide very broad coverage. One problem
with a general form of indemnification which does not make explicit
whether it is to provide indemnification in cases where the owner's
negligence allegedly causes or joins in causing the damages, is that
there is likely to be double insurance coverage with consequent dupli-
cation of cost. The owner buys coverage because there is doubt as to
whether the indemnification agreement would protect it in cases of its
own alleged negligence. On the other hand, a court might construe even
a general indemnification agreement to require that the contractor-in-
demnitor pay expenses arising out of contractor's operations and in-
curred due to negligence of the owner while the contractor is on the
premises. For this reason the contractor's insurer may also charge a
premium to cover this risk. Clarifying the agreement by expressly stat-
ing what is intended avoids duplicating insurance premium costs and
also can avoid the cost of litigating what was intended by an ambiguous
statement.
Draftsmen are confronted with the dilemma of specifying negli-
gence and frightening off prospective contractors and lessees, or else
not specifying negligence and thus providing an indemnitor with a good
argument for denying indemnity if the indemnitee is (or can arguably
be said to be) at fault. It appears from the cases that draftsmen have
by and large tried to make the indemnity as broad as possible but have
avoided mentioning fault. The problem will not go away, and litigation
is quite likely in a close case involving such a clause. If the indemnitee
expects protection against liability for his own fault, it can reasonably
be contended that the time has come to meet the issue squarely by
having the contract expressly provide such protection. There is, after
all, nothing immoral about insuring against liability for one's fault;
the propriety is not diminished because the indemnitee happens to be a
landowner instead of a motorist, and the indemnitor a contractor or
lessee instead of an insurance company.
In any event there is no answer written bold in the sky as to who
is at fault in these cases. Unless a broad indemnity clause is set up in
the contract to include fault (or, more realistically, claimed fault) of
the indemnitee, a dispute and litigation are likely. Consideration of the
following exhibits or of similar indemnity clauses specifying what is
2 For discussion of insuring against liability under indemnity contracts, see
article by Curtis, supra note 19 at pp. 270-271. The author notes that mostgeneral liability policies exclude coverage of liability incurred under a con-
tract, so that a special endorsement to provide such coverage is necessary. The
attached specimen indemnity agreements contemplate that indennitor will buy
the insurance ,and indemnitee is entitled to pass on the insurer selected and is
to receive prior notice of any cancellation of policies.
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intended in cases of fault of an indemnitee, might decrease the litigation
in the field.
EXHIBIT A
The Contractor shall save and hold. the Owner harmless from and
against all liability, damage, loss, claims, demands and actions of any
nature whatsoever which arise out of or are connected with, or are
claimed to arise out of or be connected with, any of the work done by
the Contractor, or its agents, servants, subcontractors or employees, or
which arise out of or are connected with, or are claimed to arise out of
or be connected with any accident or occurrence which happens, or is
alleged to have happened, in or about the place where such work is
being performed or in the vicinity thereof (1) while the Contractor is
performing its work, or (2) while any of the Contractor's property,
equipment, or personnel, are in or about such place or the vicinity
thereof by reason of or as a result of the performance of Contractor's
work; including without limiting the generality of the foregoing, all
liability, damages, loss, claims, demands and actions on account of
personal injury, death or property loss to Owner, its employees, agents,
subcontractors or frequenters, Contractor, its employees, agents, sub-
contractors or frequenters, or to any other persons, whether based
upon, or claimed to be based upon, statutory (including, without limit-
ing the generality of the foregoing, workmen's compensation), con-
tractual, tort, or other liability of Owner, Contractor, or any other
persons, and whether or not caused or claimed to have been caused by
active or inactive negligence or other breach of duty by Owner, its em-
ployees, agents, subcontractors or frequenters, Contractor, its em-
ployees, agents, subcontractors or frequenters, or any other person.
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the liability, damage,
loss, claims, demands and actions indemnified against shall include all
liability, damage, loss, claims, demands and actions for trade-mark,
copyright or patent infringement, for unfair competition or infringe-
ment of any other so-called "intangible" property right, for defamation,
false arrest, malicious prosecution or any other infringement of per-
sonal or property rights of any kind whatever.
The Contractor shall at its own expense investigate all such claims
and demands, attend to their settlement or other disposition, defend all
action based thereon and pay all charges of attorneys and all other
costs and expenses of any kind arising from any such liability, damage,
loss, claims, demands and actions. The Contractor shall secure, at its
own cost and expense, insurance, in amounts and with a company ac-
ceptable to and approved by the Owner, against the liability assumed in
this paragraph by the Contractor. The Contractor shall furnish the
Owner certificates of the insurance company as to the particulars of
such insurance coverage. The insurance policies shall provide that all
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notices by the insurer to the insured shall simultaneously be given to
the Owner, that at least ten (10) days prior to any cancellation of such
policies notice in writing shall be given to the Owner, and that unless
such notice is given the purported cancellation will be ineffective.
EXHIBIT B
The Contractor shall save and hold the Owner harmless from and
against all liability, claims and demands on account of personal injuries
(including, without limitation of the foregoing, workmen's compensa-
tion and death claims) or property loss or damage of any kind what-
soever, which arise out of or are in any manner connected with, or are
claimed to arise out of or be in any manner connected with, the per-
formance of this contract, regardless of whether such injury, loss or
damage shall be caused by, or be claimed to be caused by, the negli-
gence or other fault (a) of Contractor, or (b) of a subcontractor here-
under, or (c) of Owner, or (d) of some other person; or by any
agents or employees of any of the foregoing; or by accident; or other-
wise. 2-
[Include also second paragraph similar to second paragraph of
Exhibit A.]
25 See Aluminum Co. of America v. Hully, 200 F. 2d 257 (8th Cir. 1952) for a
similar clause.
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